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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
§78-2a-3(2)(J), Utah Code Annotated.
4

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court err in holding that it was not necessary for

there to be a physical delivery of the deed in order to complete the transfer of
real property.
2.

Did the Trial Court err in determining that the mere signing of the

Deed and giving copies of the Deed to his daughters constitute a valid delivery.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Inasmuch as the factual issues in this case are not in dispute, the
Appellate Court reviews the legal issues for correctness. Meadowbrook, LLC
v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. RULES, AND REGULATIONS
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF
THE APPEAL
There are no statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose
interpretations are determinative of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Linda Thomas, the daughter of the deceased Lynn Franklin Averett
5

Jackson, filed an application for informal appointment of personal
representative on September 9, 1999 and pursuant to the nomination in the Will
was appointed the personal representative of the Estate. Linda Thomas and
Connie Rowan maintain the position that the Deed signed in August of 1997
conveyed the home of Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson into three equal shares
with one-third to Linda Thomas, one-third to Connie Rowan and one-third to
the Estate of Lynn F. Jackson. Maria Jackson, the wife of Lynn Franklin
Averett Jackson, maintains the position that because the Deed was never
delivered, that the home remains the property of the Estate of Lynn Jackson
and should be conveyed pursuant to a Codicil to Lynn Jackson's Will granting
the property to Ms. Jackson. The parties agreed to set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing and prepared a Pre-Trial Order and the matter was heard in
the probate case before Judge James R. Taylor. At the conclusion of the Trial
on April 6, 2000, the Honorable James R. Taylor ruled against the
Respondent/Appellant Maria Jackson on the basis that the signing of the Deed
and giving copies to Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan completed the transfer
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of the property. The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
entered the 4th day of May, 2000. Maria Jackson/Appellant filed an appeal on
June 5, 2000.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The original deed in question was offered at trial as Plaintiffs

exhibit 1. (See a copy attached as Appendix A).
2.

In August 1997, Lynn F. Jackson (hereinafter the "Decedent"),

met with his attorney Richard Coxson along with the Decedent's two daughters
Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan in Mr. Coxson's law office in Spanish Fork
Utah. (R 59 page 8 line 14-19)
3.

Prior to the drafting of the deed Mr. Coxson and the Decedent

discussed the differences between a deed with rights of survivorship and a deed
which granted joint tenancy. (R 59 page 31 Lines 3-21)
4.

Mr. Coxson then prepared the deed according to the instructions

given by the Decedent. (R 59 page 29 lines 13- 15).
5.

The deed was not signed in Mr. Coxson's office but rather the
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Decedent, Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas went to First Security Bank
(which was within one block of the law office) wherein the Decedent signed
the Deed and had it notarized on August 19, 1997. (R 59 page 9 lines 19- page
10 line 2)
6.

There was no conversation between the Notary and the deceased

or Linda Thomas or Connie Rowan at the time of the signing of the Deed at
First Security Bank. (R 59 page 12 lines 18-20)
7.

After leaving the bank with the signed Deed, the Decedent

physically carried the deed. (R 59 page 12 line 25- page 13 line 1)
8.

The Decedent, Linda Thomas, and Connie Rowan then returned to

the Law Office of Richard Coxson and the attorney gave Linda Thomas and
Connie Rowan a copy of the Deed and gave the original back to the Decedent.
(R 59 page 13 lines 4-6 and T page 20 lines 19-22).
9.

Attorney Richard Coxson informed the Decedent that it was the

procedure in his office that he would record the Deeds that he prepared (R 59
page 32 lines 25-page 33 line 5) and that until the deed was recorded there was
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not a completed transfer of the property to his children. (R 59 page 39 lines 516)
10.

The Decedent declined to allow Mr. Coxson to record the deed

and left the attorney's office with the deed in his (Decedent's) possession. (R
59 page 33 lines 6-10)
11.

With regard to the recording of the Deed, Mr. Coxson testified as

follows:
Q.
Are you aware of any circumstances with regard to
your involvement with this Estate where Lynn Jackson ever
relinquished his control of the Deed?
A.
No, I explained to him when we were talking
about the Deed that if it were not recorded then it would not be
a complete transfer of the property to his children, that it had to
be recorded, and I told him that normally we do that and we
discussed that.
Q.
So you believe it was clear in Lynn's mind that
unless it was recorded that that was not a completed
transaction.
A.
1 explained it and he seemed to understand and
that is why he wanted to keep the Deed rather than record it.
(R 59 page 39 lines 5-16)
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12.

Pursuant to a Pre-Trial Order wherein the parties stipulated to certain

facts the parties stipulated that the deed was never recorded. (R page 39 paragraph
7).
13.

The Decedent, Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas then left the

attorney's office. Connie Rowan and her father (the Decedent) then dropped off
Linda Thomas at Ms. Thomas' home and then went to Cental Bank in Springville,
Utah where her father (the Decedent) put the Deed in his safety deposit box. (R
59 page 20 lines 23-page 21 line 3)
14.

At the time the Decedent placed the Deed into his safety deposit box,

neither Connie Rowan or Linda Thomas had a key to the safety deposit box. (R
59 page 21 lines 4-5, T Page 14 lines 5-9)
15.

From the date that the Decedent placed the Deed in his safety deposit

box until his death, he retained ownership and access to the safety deposit box. (R
59 page 22 lines 22-page 23 line 1)
16.

At no time after the Decedent placed the Deed in the safety deposit

box did Connie Rowan or Linda Thomas ever access the safety deposit box, until
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after Mr. Jackson's passing. (R 59 page 23 lines 18-page 24 line 3 see also T page
25 lines 1-13)
17.

Pursuant to a pre-trial order wherein the parties stipulated to certain

facts the parties stipulated that at the time of the Decedent's death, the original
Deed was contained in the safety deposit box of the Decedent. (R page 39
paragraph 8).
18.

Neither Linda Thomas nor Connie Rowan offered any testimony at

trial regarding any instructions from the Decedent to remove the deed from the
safety deposit box nor was any testimony offered that the Decedent ever
relinquished physical control of the deed. (See Transcript)
19.

On the 27th day of January 1998, the Decedent executed a

testamentary document entitled "Codicil to Will of Lynn Jackson." (R page 39
paragraph 12)
20.

The "Codicil to Will of Lynn Jackson" dated January 27, 1998 is the

last testamentary document known to any of the parties. (R page 39 paragraph 13)
21.

The "Codicil to Will of Lynn Jackson," reads:
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Lynn Jackson, being of sound mind and discerning
judgment hereby adds a codicil to my will making
changes thereto. These changes are to replace the
interest of Betty Willis in the estate and reduce it to 0
based upon my own reasons, she and her Decedents not
to share equally with the remaining beneficiaries. Linda
Thomas will receive $500.00 from the house and
$500.00 from US Steel. The $500.00 to be paid after the
sale of my home. Connie Rowan will receive $1,000.00
after the sale of the home. My wife will receive the
balance of my estate. (R page 5)

Attorney Mr. Coxson testified as follows:
Q.
When he put into the Codicil, MMy wife will
receive the balance of my estate," do you believe that
included the home?
A.

That was his intent.

Q.
Did he give any reasons why he was
changing the interest he was giving to his daughters.
A.
Q.
for that.

Yes he did.
Could you explain to the Court the reasons

A.
He kept saying what a terrific wife Maria
was and how happy he was with her, and he wanted to
take care of her, and he discussed that a little bit and we
12

had a discussion in private without Maria because I
wanted to make sure that I understood what he wanted
without there being unnecessary pressure there from his
wife.
Q.
Were your private conversations with him
consistent with the testimony you have given?
A.
Yes they are. (R 59 page 36 line 24 to page
37 line 15)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Lynn Franklin Jackson failed to deliver the deed even though the Court
found that he had a present intent to convey the property and consequently a valid
conveyance did not occur.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS NOT
NECESSARY FOR THERE TO BE A PHYSICAL DELIVERY OF THE
DEED IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY.
The facts in this case are not materially in dispute. The dispute arises
regarding the issue of law whether the physical delivery of the Deed was
13

necessary. All of the facts which are set out in the Statement of Facts come from
the testimonies of Linda Thomas, Connie Rowan, and Attorney Richard Coxon
which establish that from the point in time, the Decedent Lynn F. Jackson lifted
the pen from the signing of the Deed, all facts thereafter lead to the conclusion that
the Decedent had no intention of delivering the Deed as required by law. The
Decedent physically carried the Deed from First Security Bank back to Mr.
Coxson's law office. He allowed Mr. Coxson to make copies and give copies to
his daughters Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas but then retained the original
Deed in his possession. When invited by his attorney to allow the attorney to
record the Deed, Mr. Jackson declined. When instructed by Mr. Coxson that the
Deed must be recorded in order to complete the transaction, again Mr. Jackson
declined to record the Deed. Even though the advice may not have been accurate
from his attorney, it demonstrates Mr. Jackson's unwillingness to part with
possession of the Deed. From Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas own testimony,
they then left the law office, they dropped Linda Thomas off at her home and then
Mr. Jackson and Connie Rowan traveled to Central Bank in Springville, Utah,
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where Mr. Jackson placed the Deed in his safety deposit box for safe keeping.
Neither Connie Rowan nor Linda Thomas had keys or access to the safety deposit
box when the Deed was placed in it. Neither Connie Rowan or Linda Thomas
ever again went to the safety deposit box nor saw the Deed again until after the
death of Mr. Jackson. The Deed was in the safety deposit box at the time of Mr.
Jackson's death and was not retrieved until after his passing. Mr. Jackson further
took actions during his life time that would lead one to the conclusion that he had
no intent to deliver the Deed, when in January of 1998, some five months after
signing the Deed, he went to his attorney, Mr. Richard Coxson and had Mr.
Coxson draft a Codicil to the Will of Lynn Jackson which left the home to Maria
Jackson his wife, with the exception of nominal amounts being paid to Linda
Thomas and Connie Rowan.
When Mr. Jackson went to attorney Richard Coxson in January of 1998 to
prepare the Codicil to his Will, Mr. Jackson believed that he still retained
complete ownership of the home. (R 59 page 36, lines 21- page 37, line 2) The
Deed was signed the 19th of August, 1997, some five months prior to the
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preparation of the Codicil to his Will.
The Utah Case Law requires a present intent to convey plus a physical
delivery or parting with possession of the Deed in order to complete the transfer.
In all of the cases cited below, the mere signing of the Deed was insufficient to
complete the transfer of the property.
The Utah Supreme Court in Singleton v. Kelly. 212 P. 63 (Utah 1922)
states:
Counsel for Appellate say that it is a cardinal rule that the Courts will carry
out the grantors intention wherever this is possible. This is true, but without
any evidence of delivery it can be of no importance whatsoever what the
intentions of the grantor in this case were. One may have an intention to
convey his property to another, but unless the Deed is delivered to the
grantee or someone for him, title cannot pass, and the undelivered Deed is a
nullity. Id. at 66.
The Utah Supreme Court again addressed the issue of delivery of a Deed in
Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979). In Wiggill. Lillian Cheney signed
a Deed granting ownership in a certain parcel of property to Flora Cheney as
grantee. Lillian Cheney then placed the Deed in her safety deposit box which
allowed access to both Lillian Cheney and Frances E. Wiggill. Following the
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placement of the Deed in her safety deposit box, Lillian Cheney advised Wiggill
that upon her death, he was to go to the bank where he would be granted access to
the safety deposit box and was instructed to give the Deed to Lillian Cheney. The
sole question before the Supreme Court was whether based upon the above stated
facts a valid delivery of the Deed was accomplished. The Supreme Court
determined that a valid delivery did not occur and stated as follows:
The Rule is well settled that a Deed, to be operative as a transfer of
ownership of land, or an interest, or estate therein, must be delivered. It was
equally settled in this and the vast majority of jurisdictions that a valid
delivery of a Deed requires it past bevond the control or domain of the
grantor....
However, in order for delivery effectively to transfer Title, the grantor
must part with possession of the Deed or the right to retain it. ]d. at 1352.
(Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court in determining that there was not a valid transfer of the
property determined that because the grantor maintained ownership and access to
the safety deposit box that a valid delivery did not occur.
The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of delivery of a Deed in
relationship to retaining control of a safety deposit box in Bennion v. Hansen, 699
'P.2d 757 (Utah 1985). In the Bennion case, the factual background is as follows:
17

In 1972, Grover A. Hansen, a grandfather, signed an Irrevokable
Declaration of Trust granting certain property to his grandsons upon the death of
their mother, i.e. the daughter of Grover Hansen. A Deed was prepared conveying
the property into the Trust. The Deed was signed but not recorded. In 1974, the
grandfather Grover Hansen established an amendment to the Trust altering the
terms of the 1972 Trust. The Court outlined the following as part of the factual
basis:
First, there was conflicting testimony as to whether Grover Hansen
had put the Deed in the safety deposit box. Second, even if he did put the
Deed in the box, there was evidence that he did not do so with the intention
to relinquish control over it and to effect delivery into the Trust. The
evidence was undisputed that Grover maintained control over the Deed
from 1972 until 1974. No one saw either the Trust Declaration or the Deed
from 1972 until Grover produced the documents in 1974 when the
Amendments were executed and all documents were recorded. Id. at 759.
The Supreme Court concluded that since there was not a delivery of the
Deed in 1972 because Grover Hansen maintained control and possession of the
Deed but there had been no effective delivery until the Amendments to the Trust
and Deed were recorded in 1974.
The intent of the grantor in the case at hand is clear that after the execution
18

of the Deed he was unwilling to part with the possession of the Deed, allow his
attorney to record the Deed and further went to the effort of preparing a Codicil to
his Will which contradicts any intent in the Deed to convey the property to Linda
Thomas and Connie Rowan.
POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE MERE SIGNING
OF THE DEED AND GIVING COPIES OF THE DEED
TO HIS DAUGHTERS CONSTITUTE A VALID DELIVERY.
The Court at the beginning of the Trial was quite clear on the issue
presented and stated as follows:
Q.
Well (inaudible) fundamental issue. I mean a Warranty Deed
was executed by the grantor but not delivered until after his death. The
issue is whether it is effective to convey title, isn't it?
A.

Well, we don't agree (inaudible).

Q.

That is the issue.

A.
That is the issue."
(R 59 page 6, line 1-7)
The Court, however, later as the attorneys were making their closing
arguments redefined his perception of the issue in the case and stated as follows:
19

Well, what is at issue is not handing over the paper, what is at issue is
the fact that the paper and whatever goes on expresses an intent to transfer
the property. Isn't that - that is what matters. (R 59 page 71 lines 14-17)
The Court as part of its opinion indicates that there need not be a physical
delivery of the Deed when it concludes as follows:
As to the burden of proof, the burden of proof is on Mr. Weight, but
because this is not a recorded Deed, I am going to conclude as a matter of
law - - and I may be wrong on this, maybe some court will tell me and then
we will have some law on it, but my conclusion is that because it is not a
recorded Deed, the burden of proof is a preponderance. I find by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Jackson intended to transfer his
property into one-third interest and that he did - - and by executing the Deed
in the presence of his daughters, the grantees, and causing copies to be
delivered to them together with giving them access to the safety deposit box
where he specifically showed them the Deed would be kept, that he
accomplished delivery. (R 59 page 80 line 16-page 81 line 3)
The facts of this case cause one to ask: at what point in time along the
chronology of facts (if ever) does the Court determine that the transfer was
complete. It appears that the District Court made the determination of transfer at
the close of three events: 1) executing the deed, 2) causing copies of the deed to be
given to the daughters and finally 3) giving them access to the safety deposit box.
The only facts for which the parties disagree related to how Linda Thomas
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obtained a key to the safety deposit box which will be addressed in the final point.
How or when Linda Thomas obtained a key is not material in any event. Linda
testified that some time after the deed was placed in the safety deposit box her
father gave her a key. There was no testimony offered, even assuming the facts as
offered by Linda Thomas, to the effect that her father instructed her to have the
deed recorded nor did her father at any time relinquish his control or access to the
safety deposit box. In fact, Linda testified that her father gave no explanation or
instruction at the time she testified she received the key. (See Point 3 below) The
action of the parties lead to the conclusion that even if a key was given it was not
with any intent to cause delivery. No instructions were given at the time to
remove the deed. Linda never attempted to access the box until after the death of
Lynn Jackson and most importantly the only directive given to anyone regarding
the deed after its placement in the safety deposit were the written instructions
given in his Codicil to his Will giving the property to his wife.
There are a number of citations in AmJur which further enlighted the
foregoing facts:

21

... In other words, the delivery of a Deed in the law of conveyancing is a
transfer of it from the grantor to the grantee or his agent or some third party
for the grantees use, in such manner as to deprive the grantor of the right to
recall it at his option and with intent to convey title. 23 AmJur.2d 120, 156.
(Emphasis added.)
...a deed, to be operative as a transfer of the ownership of land or an interest
or estate therein, must be delivered; it is delivery that gives the instrument
force and effect. Delivery is essential regardless of what the consideration
for the Deed was. It is as necessary as the signature of the grantor and
without it all other formalities are ineffectual. Hence, delivery has been
called "the life of a deed." An undelivered Deed does not divest the grantor
of, or invest the grantee with Title, even though the intent to deliver is clear
and the failure to deliver due to accident.... 23 AmJur.2d Deeds 121, 157.
The facts, even relying only on the testimony of Linda Thomas and Connie
Rowan only, lead to the conclusion that Lynn Jackson never placed the deed
outside of his possession or right to recall it.
POINT 3
MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
COURT'S POSITION AND IN REGARD TO THE
GRANTING OF A KEY TO THE SAFETY DEPOSIT
BOX TO LINDA THOMAS.
The items contained in the Statement of Facts contain the testimony of
Linda Thomas, Connie Rowan, and Attorney Richard Coxson, court documents
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and facts which were stipulated to prior to trial by the parties. As stated
previously, the facts of the case are not disputed with the exception of the means
by which Linda Thomas obtained a key to the safety deposit box.
Linda Thomas at trial testified as follows:
Q:
I asked you previously when you were testifying if you had a
key to the deposit box.
A.

I do.

Q.

Who gave it to you?

A.

My father.

Q.
When he gave that to you, did he make any statement to you
about what it was or why he was giving it to you?
A.
He showed me where he keeps the keys and he just said, T lose
a lot of keys, so here's a copy.'
Q.

Did he tell you what the key was to?

A.

Yes, the safety deposit box.

Q.
Did he make any reference to your ability to get into that safety
deposit box?
A.

He did not really say anything about that.
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Q.
Did you discuss the contents of the box or his intention with
his respect to them when he handed the key to you?
A.

No.

Q.
Have you been back to the safety deposit box between the time
of the execution of the Deed and today?
A.

I have not. (R59 page 24 line 19 - page 25 line 13)

On our cross-examination:
Q.
Did he physically hand you a key on that day or did he give
you - or did you obtain a key later?
A.

He just said, "Here's the key," and I just took one.

Q.
Can you tell me - - can you identify when that occurred? Can
you give me an idea of season or year?
A.

I cannot. I cannot recall.

Q.

Was it prior to his death?

A.

Yes. (R59 page 26 line 24 - 27 line 6)

On redirect examination, Linda testified as follows:
Q.
You previously testified on direct the first time you were
testifying that you received a key to your father's safety deposit box about a
month to a month and one-half after he opened it?

24

A.
I can't really say for sure how long it was, I just can't
remember.
Q.

So now you don't remember, you don't - -

A.
It could have been longer than a month, a couple of months,
maybe I'm not sure about the date.
Q.

Do you think it was longer than one year?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you think it was within two months?

A.

I really can't say. (R59 page 27 line 17 - page 28 line 4)

The controverting evidence was presented by David Crosby who was the
son of Appellant Maria Jackson. David Crosby testified that prior to the death of
Lynn Jackson, Lynn indicated to him that there were two sets of keys to the safety
deposit box. (R59 page 47 lines 14-19)
Mr. Jackson identified to David Crosby that one set of key had been given
to his mother and that the other set of keys was located in a metal box which was
kept in the bedroom of Lynn Jackson and the Appellant Maria Jackson. (R59 page
47 lines 14-23)
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Lynn Jackson explained that upon his death it was important for him and his
mother to access the safety deposit box in that the safety deposit box contained
documentation by Lynn wherein he was giving everything to his wife Maria
Jackson. (R59 page 48 line 17-page 47 line 1)
After the death of Lynn Jackson, the metal box containing the keys to the
safety deposit box disappeared from the home. (R59 page 1-3)
On the night prior to the funeral of Lynn Jackson, David Crosby overheard
a conversation between Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas wherein they were
talking about the safety deposit box wherein Connie Rowan indicated that she had
been able to retrieve a key to the safety deposit box and the next day they would
go to the bank to open the safety deposit box. (R59 page 50 lines 1-14)
With the use of the keys given to Maria Jackson by her husband prior to his
death, Maria Jackson and David Crosby went the next morning and retrieved the
documents from the safety deposit box which included the Deed at issue in this
case. (R59 page 50 lines 21-page 51 line 20)
As set out above, the timing of when or how Linda Thomas obtained a key

to the safety deposit box does not materially change the issues regarding delivery
inasmuch as Lynn Jackson maintained complete control and access to the box and
for the reasons set out above.
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as the facts are not materially in dispute, the Court can determine
the merits of this case based upon the application of the law to the facts as set out.
The legal authorities set out above indicate that the mere signing of a deed does
not complete a transfer of property without the physical delivery of the deed. The
facts are abundant and undisputed that Lynn Jackson maintained control of the
deed until his death and the deed was contained in his safety deposit box after his
death.
The failure of delivery of the deed precludes an inter-vivos transfer of the
property and consequently, the Court should determine that the property passes
according to Lynn Jackson's testamentary desires as set out in the Codicil to the
Will.
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the decision of the
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District Court to determine that delivery did not occur and grant judgment in favor
of Appellant.
DATED this 18th day of Januafv, 2001,

'&4 L %L
MICHAEL K. BLACK
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ( P day of January, 2001,1 mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the following:
Gary H. Weight, Esq.
43 East 200 North
BoxL
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
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APPENDIX A
DEED

WARRANTY DEED
LYNN F. JACKSON, GRANTOR, of SPRINGVILLE City, County of Utah,
State of Utah, hereby GRANTS the ESTATE to LYNN F. JACKSON, LINDA
THOMAS AND CONNIE ROWAN, GRANTEES, of Utah County, State of Utah,
for the sum of Ten and no/100 ($10.00) Dollars, and other good and
valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in
Utah County, State of Utah:

Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains
North from the Southwest corner of Lot 3 of
Section 4, Township 8 South, Range 3 East of
the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
63 feet; thence East 100 feet; thence South 63
feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of
beginning.
Together
with
all
water
rights
appertaining thereto.
Witness the hand of said GRANTOR, th ls

H

day of

, 1997

CLu^Q M&t

W}

LYpf F. JACKS
Grantor
STATE OF UTAH
SS

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

On the V\\Wdav of

^\^<Q - v ^ ^ r -

., 1997, personally

appeared before me LYNN F. JACKSON, the signer of the within
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

^

^

— ^ &

PLAINTIFFS
BtTNO.

f-

CAROLYN I . KARTELL
mm

ntuc. STATE »t urn

fc\$
FIRST SECURITY BAHX
\'A fll«S!ffl W 8S2 NORTH 100 EAST
'"' SMMSHFORK, UTAH 84860

COMM. EXP. 2-15-00

NOTARY PUBLIC

APPENDIX B
CODICIL TO WILL OF LYNN JACKSON

CODICIL TO WILL OF
LYNN JACKSON
Lynn Jackson, being of sound mind and discerning judgment,
hereby adds a Codicil to my will making changes thereto. These
changes are to replace the interest of Betty Willis^in the estate
and reduce it t£^$GIRftBfbased upon my own reasons, she and her
descendants not To share equally with the remaining beneficiaries.
Linda Thomas will receive $500.00 from the house and $500.00 from
U.S.-Steele, the $500.00 to be paid after the sale of the home.
Connie Rowan will receive $1,000.00 after the sale of the home. My
wife will receive the balance of my estate.
Second, as my personal representative, Linda Thomas will serve
first as sole personal representative, to be succeeded by 4M£fe>
4M0BM. If neither of these survive me, or are disqualified for
any reason, Connie Rowan will be the alternate successor personal
representative.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name to this
a Codicil to my Last Will and Testament, consisting of this
typewritten page and for the purpose of identification I have
signed this page in the presence of the persons witnessing it a£ mYrequest on this£T7day o f J ^ M i l % - ' 1 9 9 -£' at J^ZL^'< LP^i&
, Utah.

3* (la^fe^m^

L M F. JACKSOft
TESTATOR

The foregoing instrument, consisting of this page, was signed
and declared by LYNN F. JACKSON, the Testator, to be a Codicil to
his Last Will and Testament, in our presence, and we, at his
request and in the presence of each other have hereunto subscribed
our names as witnesses, thisoZ ydav of

199j^ at ^p/k^J^ L_ ^JJW^

WITNESS

yjJ/TSLi

Utah.

mu/1>

NESS

APPENDIX C
TRANSCRIPT OF COURT'S ORAL RULING

-781 I it just —

at the end of the first sentence, the word,

2

"following," and I think this is what is significant.

3

"Following the deposition of the deed, Lillian Chaney's

4

(inaudible) advice plaintiff (inaudible) the safety deposit box

5

and instructed plaintiff that upon her death he should go to

6 j.the bank where he would be granted access to the safety deposit
7

box and its contents.

8

Then if you skip a number of sentences and go to the

9

last one of that paragraph it says, "At all times prior to her

10

death Lillian Chaney was in possession of the key to the safety

11 I deposit box and had sole and complete control of it.
12

Plaintiff

was never given a key to the safety deposit box."

13

These facts are distinguishable from the facts of this

14

case because in this case there were no specific instructions

15

that only upon the event of death would they have access to the

16

box—

17
18

THE COURT:

The language here clearly is that there

was no immediate or present intent—

19
20

MR. WEIGHT:

Right.

And further, Linda Thomas always

had a key from within a couple of months of his opening the

21 I box.

We still take the position that's a present intent that

22 | he conveyed it away and therefore what he had conveyed away he
23 I could not effect by a will, what he did own he could.

24 I you.
25 |

THE COURT:

The tough thing about these cases

Thank

-79sometimes is that it appears that Mr. Jackson changed his mind,
and had he lived another month or two he may have changed his
mind one or two more times.

Sometimes it seems like the wheel

on jeopardy, as it goes around you end up with what you end up
with (inaudible).
MR. BLACK:

Wheel of Fortune.

THE COURT:

The Wheel of Fortune, and maybe that's not

a good reference of this case. The evidence that I have heard
with regard to the delivery is that it appears that Mr. Jackson
wanted to console his family because of an impending marriage,
that his family expressed some concern that the interests of
his wife to be were not all together pure, and that he wanted
to preserve his home for his family.
So he made the appointment with Mr. Coxson, went to
Mr. Coxson's office with his two daughters and went through the
motions of preparing a deed to the daughters.

He was

specifically advised of the difference between deeds of rights
of succession and a deed of tenancy in common that would be a
joint tenant as opposed to a tenant in common.

He understood.

The only evidence I have is that he understood, that the deed,
Exhibit 1, as prepared divided the property into one-third
interests equally, and it was his specific instruction that it
be prepared that way.
He went to the trouble of going with his daughters and
having it notarized, having it delivered, and delivering a copy

-801

of the deed at that point to them, and then instead of

2

recording the deed took it to the safety deposit box where he

3

kept his important papers.

4

The codicil which was written does not, in my view,

5

specifically contradict the division of the property at the

6

time that the deed was written, because although he talks about

7

delivering money after the sale of the home, he was also clear

8

at the time that he was with Mr. Coxson that he was

9

instructing —

and that he still owned a third of the home, and

10

he did that on purpose because he wanted to maintain an

11

ownership interest in the home, he was specifically avoiding a

12

situation where he would be living in a home that did not

13

belong to him at all.

14

interest in the home, and he did that —

15

the deed.

16

He wanted to maintain an ownership
accomplished that by

As to the burden of proof, the burden of proof is on

17

Mr. Weight, but because this is not a recorded deed I am going

18

to conclude as a matter of law —

19

maybe some court will tell me and then we'll have some law on

20

it, but my conclusion is that because it is not a recorded

21

deed, the burden of proof is a preponderance.

22

preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Jackson intended to

23

transfer his property into one-third interests, and that he

24

did —

25

daughters, the grantees, and causing copies to be delivered to

and I may be wrong on this,

I find by

and by executing the deed in the presence of his

-811

them together with giving them access to the safety deposit box

2

where he specifically showed them the deed would be kept, that

3

he accomplished delivery.

4

severed into one-third interests, and the estate actually

5

effectively only contains one-third.

6 *
7

appropriate findings?
MR. WEIGHT:

9

THE COURT:

11

That is my ruling.

Mr. Weight, can you prepare an appropriate order and

8

10

So I find that the home has been

I'll do that.
Is there anything else that I need to

determine at this time?

Thank you.

(Trial concluded)
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County. State of Utah
^'4^QL('

Deputy

1

GARY H. WEIGHT (#3415)
^ i<^
v
uepuiy
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
2 H Attorneys for Linda Thomas
43 East 200 North, P.O. Box ML"
3 || Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 373-4912
4
IN 11 Hi FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
5
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
6
7 I In the Matter of the Estate of:

: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
rrc T AW V*JD JUDGMENT

8 | LYNN FRANKLIN AVERETT JACKSON,
91|

jbdteN> 993400423
: Division. ':
: Judge" James k Aa>ior

Deceased.

10
11

This matter came before the Court foi

I null 11n niI,I', Personal

12

Representative o I I Kit: I state of Lynn Franklin Avercit J^k^cn appeareu . person and with counsel, Gary

13

H Weight. Maria Jackson, surviving widow of the Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson appeared

14

in person and with counsel, Michael K. Black. Counsel for the parties called witnesses and presented

15

evii

16

enters the following:

.ourt being advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, now

17
18
19
20 I
21 I
22 ||
23 II

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

'Jecedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson, during his life, owned
property in Utah County, State of Utah described as follows:
Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains north
from the Southwest corner of Lot 3 of Section 7,
Township 8 South, Range 3 East of the Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence North 63 feet; thence East 100 feet;
thence South 63 feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of
beginning.
Together with all water rights appertaining thereto.

24

Said properly \v(is acquired I'v llic Decedent by VV.uI.nitv Deed K.\K\ uliil by I'.'lmn l,loyt.l

25

Fullmer and Jennie Fullmer on April 4, 1946.

1

2.

The Court finds that during his life, the Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson mad

2

an appointment with Richard Coxon, an attorney at law, and met wit Mr. Coxon with hi

3

daughters Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan.

4J

3.

The Court finds that Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson was advised by Richari

5

Coxon of the differences between a joint tenancy deed, a tenancy in common deed an<

6|

the rights of succession. The Courtfindsthat the Decedent understood the informatioi

7I

explained to him by Richard Coxon.

8|

4.

9J

The Courtfindsthat Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson instructed Richard Coxoi
to prepare a Warranty Deed which would convey his interest in the property set forth ii

10

the paragraph above to himself and his daughters Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan a*

11

tenants in common.

12

5.

13
14

The Court finds that the Deed was executed by the Decedent knowingly and
understanding^ on August 19, 1997 and was notarized the same day.

6.

The Court finds that copies of the Warranty Deed were given to Linda Thomas and

15

Connie Rowan by Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson and that the original was

16

placed in the Decedent's safety deposit box. The Court further finds that Decedent gave

17

his daughters access to the safety deposit box by making a key available to Linda Thomas,

18

Personal Representative.

19

7.

The Court finds that the Warranty Deed executed by the Decedent on August 19, 1997

20

was delivered to the gramtees and that the conveyance was completed prior to Decedent's

21

death.

22

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following:

23
24
25

2

CONCLUSIONS OI< LAW
Court concludes as a matter of law that the Warranty Deed executed on August 19, 1997
3 was delivered to the grantees and that the Decedent conveyed away two-thirds of his interest in the
4 following described property to Linda Thomas in 11

h I

I

i uiii Imli-a

5 matter of law that the Decedent retained a one-third interest in the property which is presently an asset
6 of his estate. The property is located in Utah County, State of Utah and particularly described as follows:
Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains north
from the Southwest corner of Lot 3 of Section 7,
Township 8 South, Range 3 East of the Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence North 63 feet; thence East 100 feet;
thence South 63 feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of
beginning.
Together with all water rights appertaining thereto.

7
8
9

ii

I nun Hit 11 II egoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters the following:
JUDGMENT

12
13

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Estate of Lynn Franklin

14 Avetett lack son I imj,i II

I,I

iml I m

\l 11\\ ai< LMI.IMIWM an undivided one-third interest in and to

15 the following described property located in Utah County, State of Utah:
Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains north
from the Southwest corner of Lot 3 of Section 7,
Township 8 South, Range 3 East of the Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence North 63 feet; thence East 100 feet;
thence South 63 feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of
beginning.
Together with all waterrightsappertaining thereto.

16
1/
18
19
20
21

DATED this _

fAprilrSOOO.

••"

• v^THE^OUR^t

22
23
24
25

JAMES R. TAYLOI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGI

"^ ...

^

1 I Approved as to Form:
2
3 H MICHAEL K. BLACK
Attorney for Maria Jackson
4"
5I
6

MAILING CERTIFICATE

fl
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ H
| foregoing to the following:

I
9J
10 n
1 1 II

day of April, 2000, a copy of th(

Michael K. Black
Attorney at Law
360 West 900 North
Orem, Utah 84058

.

NOTICE OF INTENT TCTSUBMTT FOR SIGNATURE

12 TO MICHAEL K. BLACK, ATTORNEY FOR MARIA JACKSON:
13

You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Linda Thomas will submit the abovt

14 and foregoing Order to the Honorable James R. Taylor for his signature upon the expiration offive(5]
15 days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection isfiledprioi
16 | to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
17 1
18 1
19
20
21
22
23 fi
24
25

DATED this ^ ^ a y of April, 2000.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

